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The American political tradition has generally recognized that the
people have a moral right to revolution: when a government becomes
tyrannical, the citizenry may, by force of arms, overthrow it and institute
a new, more acceptable one. The constitutional status of this right is,
however, the subject of considerable doubt. It is commonly argued that
the moral rigfit to revolution cannot be a constitutional right because the
concepts of revolution and constitution are, at a deep level, in conflict.1
A revolution, by definition, attempts to change the fundamental politico-
legal order. A constitution, by definition, attempts to entrench that order.
In other words, the purposes of a constitution and a revolution are deeply
different: a constitution seeks to create order, a revolution to undo order.
It would be absurd, in this view, to assume that a constitution contains
the seeds of its own undoing by creating a right to revolution. Further-
more, as soon as a revolution commences, it must cease to be a constitu-
tional activity because the people leave the constituted order and return
to the state of nature. Thus, the methods and political forms of constitu-
tion and revolution are deeply different: constitutional activity is governed
by the founding rules of a given constitutional regime, but revolution is
governed by, at best, natural equity, and at worst, main force. In this view,
therefore, revolution and constitution are inherently in tension, and a
constitutional right to revolution is an oxymoron. For that reason, I will
call this argument the inconsistency claim. 2
This Article will argue that the inconsistency claim is overbroad,
because it fails to distinguish between two critically different types of
revolution.3 With regard to the goals of revolution, while all revolutions
'Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. For their
helpful comments, I would like to thank Sanford Levinson, Scott Powe, Susan Williams,
Nancy Rosenblum, and Jack Rakove.
' See infra Part II.
21 elaborate and give examples of the inconsistency argument in Part II of this Article.
3 The focus of the inconsistency argument and my response to it is significantly
eurocentric, in terms of the intellectual tradition and examples upon which both rely. The
reason is that the consistency of revolution and constitution has especially agitated those
of European legal heritage. It has not so agitated those of other traditions, in part because
formal constitutions have played a less prominent part in non-European traditions. Any
complete theory of the Second Amendment and the American revolutionary tradition would
have to compare this country's experience with those of Africa, Asia, and Central and
South America, but such a theory is beyond the scope of this Article.
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aim to overthrow government, the inconsistency claim is wrong in main-
taining that all revolutions aim to destroy the existing constitutional order.
On the contrary, some revolutions are made to preserve the traditional
order against the efforts of innovative government officials to change it;
indeed, the American revolutionaries began their war as professed defend-
ers of the British Constitution.4 Armed revolt against such a government
is therefore not an attack on the constitution but an attempt to protect it.
Thus, the chief error made by the inconsistency claim is to assume that
government and constitution are the same thing, so that a revolt against
one is necessarily a revolt against the other. In fact, the two are concep-
tually quite distinct. In some circumstances the government might even
be opposed to the constitution. Therefore, a constitution could conceptu-
ally protect a right to conservative revolution-a right to protect the
preexisting constitutional order against government officials who would
subvert it.5
Similarly, with regard to the methods of revolution, the inconsistency
claim fails to distinguish between different types of revolution. Some
uprisings break the constitutional frame and plunge us back into the state
of nature-as the inconsistency claim commonly puts it, some revolutions
reduce us to anarchy. 6 Revolutions are not, however, inherently anarchical.
Theoretically, they could follow implicit or explicit constitutional norms
for the conduct of revolutionary movements, staying well within the set-
tled legal landscape and well away from the legal wilderness of the state
of nature. When a government has set itself against the constitution, such
a revolutionary movement may be more law-abiding than the government
itself. In this vein, the chief error made by the inconsistency claim is to
assume that there can be nothing between conventional, standing govern-
ment on the one hand, and anarchy and mob violence on the other. In
fact, there are many things in between-more or less orderly, more or less
popular political forms that are neither governmental nor anarchical. In-
deed, such forms may be necessary for any healthy democracy, and a
democratic constitution might protect them for precisely that reason7
In short, then, there is nothing conceptually incoherent in the idea of
a constitutional right to revolution. There are, however, important inherent
limits in the idea that it must be conservative. First, the goal of any such
4 See infra text accompanying notes 53-64.
5 Because the idea of "conservative revolution" is in the air, let me quickly distinguish
my usage of this phrase from other, more common ones. By a conservative revolution, I
mean specifically armed insurrection against government officials who seek to overthrow
the constitutional order, for the purpose of restoring that constitutional order. I do not
mean sudden change brought about through the legislature or the judiciary to move the
country in a right-wing direction. The word "conservative" thus refers only to conserving
the constitution, not to a place on the political spectrum.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 33 and 37.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 84-90.
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revolution must always and only be to preserve the constitutional order,
not to change it. Such a truly conservative revolution may have never
occurred. Some revolutions may start as attempts at restoration, but inevi-
tably they end up dreaming larger, newer dreams. Even the American
Revolution, notoriously the most conservative of revolutions, eventually
turned to more democratic ideas.8 As a result, most revolutions may,
sooner or later, become unconstitutional as they seek to institute a new
and better order of things.
Second, the form and method of a conservative revolution must be
governed by constitutional norms. Revolution is a political activity, and
there are a variety of ways to order such activity: revolutionary move-
ments can be more or less democratic, more or less respectful of individ-
ual rights, more or less decentralized, et cetera. For a revolution to be
constitutional, the constitutional order must contain some norms about
how to carry out a revolution, and the revolution must conform to those
norms. Again, such a truly conservative revolution may never have oc-
curred: the early stages of revolutionary movements are often filled with
discussion about preexisting constitutional limits, but as time goes on, the
revolutionaries begin to develop their own forms.
Thus, the people do not create a constitutional revolution in the
militant, unbounded exercise of self-rule; rather, they act within the dic-
tates of a constitutional tradition imposed on them by the past. As soon
as revolutionary movements become completely self-determining, they
have ceased to be constitutional. A new constitution may result from such
an exercise of self-determination, but the exercise itself cannot be said to
be governed by a constitution. In short, most, perhaps all, revolutions
leave their constitutional moorings and become the sort of revolution with
which we are most familiar: the people wreaking their will on the world,
creating their political landscape anew in a great exertion of self-defini-
tion.
Theoretically, then, although a constitution could guarantee a right of
revolution, in practice it may be very difficult to determine whether a
given revolution is in fact constitutional. That difficulty arises for two
reasons: constitutional change and constitutional interpretation. Most con-
stitutions have internal rules for change, and during revolution such inter-
nal change may come thick and fast. A constitutional revolution must
protect the constitution in its present form, however new or shifting that
form may be. In practice, however, it may be difficult to distinguish
between a revolution made to preserve a changing constitution and a
revolution made to repudiate the old constitutional order and replace it
with a new one. That difficulty is compounded by the problems inherent
8 See infra text accompanying notes 65-66.
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in constitutional interpretation. Even during peaceful times, with the help
of settled institutions like the Supreme Court, Americans vituperatively
disagree about the meaning of the Constitution. One would have to specu-
late that during armed conflict guided only by a brand new revolutionary
movement, that disagreement would be significantly more severe.
This Article will proceed in five Parts. Part I will formally state the
question that I wish to address whether: (1) a constitution could coher-
ently protect a right to revolt, and (2) what difference it makes whether
the right to revolution arises from a constitution or from natural law. Part
II will present the inconsistency claim and offer examples of that claim
made by prominent American thinkers. Part III delineates the heart of the
argument: that a constitution can coherently protect a right to revolt
against government in defense of the constitutional order. Part IV elabo-
rates on the severe, inherent limits on a constitutional revolution, and
explains how constitutional interpretation and constitutional change make
those limits obscure in practice. The conclusion then suggests that, for all
of its theoretical limits and practical difficulties, a constitutional right to
revolution might be an important and useful concept in the American
political tradition.
I. The Question
A. Distinguishing the Question
The question whether there is an inherent tension between constitu-
tion and revolution, such that it is conceptually impossible that the United
States Constitution could protect a right to revolution, must be carefully
distinguished from several different but related questions. First, whether
the U.S. Constitution could conceptually protect a right to revolution is
independent of whether it does protect such a right. In particular, it is
independent of whether the drafters of the Constitution intended to guar-
antee a right to revolution. Second, some have argued that the Second
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the people's right to keep
arms in readiness for revolution.9 Whether the people have a constitutional
9 See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MicH. L. REv. 204 (1983); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment,
Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REv. 103 (1987). I have
argued elsewhere that the Second Amendment once protected the people's right to own
arms for revolution but no longer does so because of changes in the nature of the citizenry.
If the citizenry should change again, it might reacquire a Second Amendment right to
arms. See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and tile Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991) [hereinafter Williams, Civic Republican-
ism]. Under the latter circumstance, the Constitution would guarantee a right to arms for
revolution, but would not necessarily guarantee the tight of revolution itself. As explained
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right to own arms for revolution is, however, not the same question as
whether the people have a constitutional right to revolt. The difference
between those two questions, though subtle, is nonetheless important.
Conceivably, the Constitution might guarantee a right to own arms in
preparation for revolution, but once the revolution actually commences,
we might, by definition, return to the state of nature, rendering the Con-
stitution irrelevant. Third, whether the people have a natural right to
revolution is independent of whether they have a constitutional right to
revolution. The people might have a moral right to overthrow a tyrannical
government and institute a new one, but the Constitution might in no
sense create, limit, govern, or protect such a right. In short, it is possible
to imagine the following legal regime: in recognizing a natural right to
revolution, the Constitution protects a popular right to arms, but once the
people begin a revolution, the constitutional frame cracks, and we must
look to some other body of norms to consider the legitimacy of such
activity.' 0
B. Defining Key Terms
To distinguish more clearly between natural and constitutional rights
to revolution, and to consider why such a distinction should even matter,
it is necessary first to define the concept of "revolution" with greater
precision."l Perhaps because revolution is such a freighted concept, some
in the text, it would be coherent for the Constitution to protect the means of revolution
but leave it to natural law to protect and govern the underlying right of revolution itself.
10 The question whether revolution can be a constitutional activity is also not the same
as whether revolution can result in a new constitutional order. Successful revolutions can,
of course, create new constitutions. Indeed, some have argued that to be successful,
revolutions must give rise to stable constitutions that protect freedom, however defined.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REvOLUTION 46-68 (1992); HANNAH
ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 125-26, 139-40 (1963). Similarly, whether revolution can be
constitutional is also not the same question as whether a new constitution can be
revolutionary in the sense of making a clean break with the established legal order. A
lively debate is presently ongoing concerning whether the American Constitution was
revolutionary in this sense. Compare Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional
Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 475 (1995) (revolutionary), and Charles Fried, The Supreme
Court, 1994 Term, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995) (revolutionary),
with Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457 (1994) (not revolutionary). By contrast with both of
those questions, the question at hand is whether an ongoing revolution can itself be
constitutional, in the sense of being governed by a preexisting fundamental body of legal
norms not created by the revolution itself or any associated new constitution.
11 When I refer to constitutional rights, I mean rights protected by a constitution,
whether or not they are also natural rights. When I refer to natural rights, I mean rights
protected only by natural law and not by a constitution. The reason for this distinction
stems from the inconsistency claim's assertion that the right of revolution can be a natural
right but cannot be a constitutional right. The critical question therefore is whether the
right to revolution is (1) a natural right that is not also a constitutional right (as the
1997]
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have proposed highly specific substantive definitions.' 2 Many have fo-
cused on the degree of change, arguing that a revolt is not a true revolu-
tion unless it radically changes the preexisting politico-legal order.13 Some
have defined revolution in terms of its substantive goals; Hannah Arendt,
for example, argued that the aim of a true revolution is public freedom,
rather than economic happiness. 14 I offer a definition that is simpler but
more useful for present purposes. The functional question that I wish to
examine is whether the people might, without logical contradiction, have
a constitutional right to take up arms against an oppressive government.
Accordingly, I will define a revolution as a popular attempt by armed
violence to change the present form or personnel of government. Such a
revolution will necessarily produce change, but the change need not be
total or sweeping; indeed, it may involve no more than substituting one
(hopefully more faithful) set of officeholders for another within the same
governmental structure. Such a revolution also must be popular in some
broad sense-an act of the people, rather than a putsch or coup d'etat.
Within that parameter, however, it need not create any particular type of
democratic or liberal system. The core of this definition is therefore armed
resistance to government, because that is the activity of which the consti-
tutional status is at issue.' 5
inconsistency claim asserts) or (2) a constitutional right, whether or not it is a natural right
(as the inconsistency claim denies).
12Because I am here examining the right to revolution against government, I consider
definitions of political revolution, not economic, scientific, cultural, or social revolutions,
even though the line separating all these types of revolution is sometimes very fine.
13 Hannah Arendt, for example, maintains that a revolution must constitute a truly new
beginning in the affairs of people. See ARENDT, supra note 10, at 28-35. Bruce Ackerman
cautions that "a total change in governing principles" would be impossible, but he still
defines a revolution in terms of fundamental (if less than total) change: "A revolution is
a successful effort to transform the governing principles and practices of a basic aspect
of life through an act of collective and self-conscious mobilization." ACKERMAN, .supra
note 10, at 5-6. Similarly, Charles Fried asserts that a revolution involves "a clear break
with previous sources of legal authority." Fried, supra note 10, at 17. Under such a
definition, a revolution is tautologically anticonstitutional, because the goal of a revolution
must be to change the fundamental politico-legal order. As I explain in the text, I believe
that such a definition is inappropriate if the question is whether a constitution might
sanction resistance to government.
14 See ARENDT, supra note 10, at 31-35. For Arendt, the complete definition of a
revolution involves three elements: violence, a new beginning, and public freedom. See id.
at 35.
15This definition thus includes violence as one of its elements, as do the definitions
formulated by Amar and Arendt, see AMAR, supra note 10, at 462-63, and ARENDT, supra
note 10, at 18-20, 35. By contrast, Ackerman's definition would recognize both violent
and persuasive revolutions, and he urges would-be revolutionaries not to use violence. See
ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 13. Ackerman's definition of revolution proceeds from a
different concern from my own. His interest in revolution is not whether the people have
a right to armed resistance; instead, he is principally interested in how self-conscious
political movements can generate liberal constitutions. See id. at 14.
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By a constitution, I mean a set of written or unwritten legal norms
that are considered to be more fundamental than and superior to all other
legal norms within a given polity. These norms may or may not always
be enforceable in a court of law, but they must be generally accepted by
the members of a polity as binding on them.1 6 The question at issue is
whether the people might have a constitutional right to revolution. Weak
forms of constitutionalism, in which constitutional norms are only con-
ventions or aspirational ideals, create no rights at all in the sense that the
term "rights" is commonly used-rights as trumps. 17 Such weak constitu-
tions therefore could not create a right to revolution because they do not
create rights of any kind, not because there is a logical contradiction
between revolution and constitution.
Though perhaps no less important, natural law is distinct from con-
stitutional law. In contrast to constitutional rights, within the Enlighten-
ment tradition in general and social contract theory in particular, natural
rights are those rights that belong to all individuals at all times and places
by virtue of being human. So defined, constitutional rights are different
from natural rights in at least three important ways.
First, the content of constitutional and natural rights may overlap, or
they may differ. Constitutional rights may (perhaps should) include some
or all hatural rights, but they need not. Further, a constitution may make
concrete by codification the scope of natural rights-it may adapt the
content of a natural right to a given place and time, and it may define the
content of an ambiguous natural right with greater precision. Finally, a
constitution may include rights other than natural rights.
Second, the origins of natural rights and constitutional rights are
significantly different. Natural law is that law appropriate to human indi-
viduals by virtue of their moral status as human individuals; as a result,
it is operative in all places and times. Constitutional law, by contrast, is
the constitution of a particular legal community; it is binding on its
citizens by virtue of their membership in a particular ongoing, historically
situated, political association. A constitution, even when it does incorpo-
rate natural law, adds an additional element of obligation by making it
part of the organic law for a particular community, rather than just the
universal law for abstract individuals. 18
16 Charles Fried's formulation of the concept is similar, a constitution "identifies what
the law of the society is and how laws are made, and sometimes defines the proper
subjects, types, and contents of law." Fried, supra note 10, at 24. It is, in short, "a
developing but continuous constituted structure judging and generating law." Id. at 33.
'
7 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 188-92 (1978) (arguing
that constitutional rights are rights in the "strong sense," giving American citizens the right
to disobey any law that wrongly invades these rights).
18In particular cases, when a constitution seeks to protect natural rights, it tends to
blur the origin of the rights involved. That blurring, however, should not obscure the basic
difference. If citizens regard a constitution as only an expression of natural rights and
1997]
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Third, the materials and techniques for interpreting natural rights may
be different from those for interpreting constitutional rights. To determine
the content of natural rights, one consults natural law. More specifically,
within certain religious traditions, one would consult the Bible, along with
the teachings of religious authorities and/or visionaries. Within the social
contract tradition, one would consult the implications of the concept of
the free, rational, and equal human agent. By contrast, to determine the
content of constitutional rights, one consults the text (if any) of the
constitution itself, associated documents, and customary understandings
and authoritative pronouncements of its meaning. For the U.S. Constitu-
tion in particular, one might consult the text of the Constitution and its
amendments, Supreme Court cases, the documentary history of the con-
gresses and conventions that drafted and ratified its language, and widely
shared popular and legal assumptions about the meaning of the Constitu-
tion.
C. The Significance of the Difference between Constitutional and
Natural Rights to Revolution
These three differences offer an explanation of why it matters whether
Americans have a constitutional or only a moral right to revolution. First,
the type of right affects its enforceability. Citizens regard a constitutional
right as a matter settled and legally binding among themselves, by them-
selves, and for themselves at a given time and place. Such a right is
sanctioned by the very act of their constitution as a single legal commu-
nity, and so it is inseparable from their existence as a legal community.
A constitutional right to revolution is thus the product of fundamental
positive law, and it should be enforceable in the way that other such rights
are enforceable within any given legal system-perhaps even by legal
action in court. By contrast, a natural right to revolution is the property
of all peoples at all times and places. For that very reason, it is largely
theoretical, sanctioned only by the appeal to Heaven. 19 Such natural rights
binding only insofar as it expresses natural rights, then the fact of constitution adds
nothing to natural law. One school of constitutional interpretation takes this point of view.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 15
(1982) (describing the Constitution as an expression of natural law). By the same token,
although a constitution might seek generally to enshrine natural law, the rights are
essentially constitutional if citizens follow the constitution even when they suspect that it
diverges from natural law. Finally, in rare cases, a constitution may provide simply that it
protects natural law, without any more detail. In such a case, the practical difference
between constitutional law and natural law may disappear, as it would be neither necessary
nor possible to decide whether the right receives protection because of the constitution or
because of natural law. Still, one might recognize a theoretical difference even here-a
right might be protected because it is in the constitution (which happens to protect natural
law) or because it is in natural law (which the constitution happens to protect).19Locke explains that when a prince refuses to submit to the will of the people
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might theoretically place moral limits on all positive law, but those limits
arise only from the rather abstract dictates of "nature and of nature's
God." 20
Second, because of the different materials and techniques used in the
interpretation of a constitutional and a natural right to revolution respec-
tively, the nature of the inquiries would be distinct. Interpretation of a
constitutional right to revolution would be heavily documentary, designed
to determine the meaning of a preexisting feature of our constitutional
order. By contrast, inquiry into a natural right to revolution would involve
abstract consideration of God's will or the nature of human rationality,
individuality, and freedom. Inevitably, perhaps notoriously, such a direct
inquiry into natural rights is more abstract and amorphous than an inquiry
into constitutional meaning. It also deems irrelevant most of the material
of constitutional law, because natural law transcends and controls all such
culturally and historically specific acts as the constitution. If the materials
of constitutional law fail to safeguard a natural right, then the constitution
is simply wrong.2
Third, for both of the foregoing reasons, the relationship among
citizens during a constitutional revolution is different from their relation-
ship during a revolution sanctioned only by natural law. Constitutional
revolutionaries must appeal to other Americans as Americans, citizens
sharing a particular legal tradition and owing one another particular, histori-
cally contingent obligatiois. Constitutional revolutionaries may also demand
acquiescence in a revolution because of this set of shared norms, obliga-
tions, and histories. And these revolutionaries make their revolution as
coparticipants in an ongoing, constituted cultural enterprise. By contrast,
natural law revolutionaries must appeal to others as human beings who
possess rights simply by virtue of being human.22 Their revolution is
potentially worldwide, because political boundaries are simply arbitrary
marks on a map. Theoretically, every person in the world would have the
same right or obligation to participate in every war of liberation. Natural
law revolution would be governed not by shared, historically entrenched
understandings, but by direct appeal to natural justice.
regarding the meaning of the social contract, then "the Appeal lies only to Heaven," rather
than to some constituted, earthly forum. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of
Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 283, para. 242 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960)
[hereinafter LOCKE, Second Treatise].20THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).21The materials of constitutional law might aid the inquiry into natural rights
indirectly: some of the drafters of constitutional law were trying to codify natural law, so
natural lawyers might look to the constitution for suggestions about the content of natural
law. Those suggestions, however, have no more authority than any others.
22 Perhaps the most famous example of such an approach is the French Revolution.
See ARENDT, supra note 10, at 148-49.
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A concrete illustration of these differences is as follows: If revolution
is a constitutional fight, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols could con-
ceivably offer it as a defense in their trials, and the judge could conceiv-
ably recognize it. The court could find that, protected by the Constitution,
the right of revolution is currently part of America's fundamental legal
structure, enforceable in a court of law, and all other Americans are
required to respect it. To be sure, the court might (and should) decide that
even if the Constitution does protect a right of revolution, it does not
extend to the actions of McVeigh and Nichols. But if the right to revolu-
tion is only natural and not constitutional, then the defendants could not
even appropriately raise it in a court of law; such a plea belongs only in
the court of Heaven, because it does not derive from any legal norm
cognizable in an American jurisdiction.23
In summary, the distinction could be formulated in the following way,
perhaps somewhat overdrawn for clarity. A constitutional revolution is
conceptually nothing more than the normal interpretation and enforcement
of constitutional rules in an extreme and perhaps dizzying set of circum-
stances. It does not alter the basic legal relationships among citizens, nor
does it disrupt the preexisting fundamental order. By contrast, a revolution
based only on natural law does disrupt that order, and, in an important
sense, it casts citizens into a legal wilderness with few clear landmarks.
Such revolutionaries must work out their civil and political relationships
anew, and they must try to bring some new legal order out of the wilds.
Depending on one's perspective, then, a constitutional revolution may
seem hopelessly conservative, crabbed by the dead hand of the past.
Alternatively, it may seem reassuringly to offer some measure of safety
in a time of turmoil. By contrast, a natural law revolution may seem
chaotic and threatening, or it may seem wonderfully hopeful and full of
possibility. Whichever perspective one adopts, it matters whether the right
to revolution is constitutional or only natural.
II. The Inconsistency Claim
For some time, one school of historians has described the U.S. Con-
stitution as a conservative reaction against the perceived excesses of the
revolutionary period. Rich and powerful elites sought to centralize power
into the hands of a stable, distant central government and to limit the
populist state legislatures that had proved insufficiently respectful of prop-
erty and hierarchy.24 Some early rural rebels echoed this view. In protest-
23 For another illustration of the distinction between natural and constitutional law, see
the discussion of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), infra note 48.24 See generally E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776-1790 (1961); MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF
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ing taxes or property inequality, they claimed the legacy of the American
Revolution. 25 By contrast, those who resisted the rebels' demands cast
themselves as defenders of the new constitution and the rebels as malcon-
tents unwilling to reconcile themselves to the constitutional order.26 The
revolutionary mood was thus expansive, ebullient, unstable, and erratic;
the constitutional mood was narrow, fearful, orderly, and careful.
This historical change in mood illustrates in a particular instance the
essence of the inconsistency claim. Not just the American Revolution, but
revolution generally is about disorder and change; not just the American
Constitution, but constitutionalism generally is about order and stability.
Therefore, a constitution cannot contain a right of revolution, because
such a right would be inconsistent with the nature of a constitution itself.
More formally stated, the inconsistency claim has two primary ele-
ments. First, some have argued that the purpose of a revolution is to
change the established politico-legal order, but the purpose of a constitu-
tion is to preserve that order. Therefore, a constitutional guarantee to a
right of revolution would contradict that constitution's very raison d'tre.
A constitutional right of revolution would be a suicide note, written by
the framers on behalf of the constitutional order even as they brought that
order into being.2 7 I will call this view the purpose-inconsistency argu-
ment.
Second, the form and method of a revolution are different from the
form and method of a constitution. Constitutional government proceeds
according to known, fixed, consensual rules and within established insti-
tutions. By contrast, revolutions tend to swirl out of control as the people
take power into their own hands and make the political world anew. In a
revolution, the constitutional frame cracks as citizens are plunged into the
state of nature and must devise new forms and methods to advance the
revolution. I will call this view the method-inconsistency argument.
CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781 (1940); MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789 (1950). For a
brief summary of Ferguson's and Jensen's views, see JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS
OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
xiv-xv (1979). Others have denied this discontinuity between the revolution and the
Constitution, portraying the Constitution as resting on the revolution's fundamental principles.
See ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 48-54; ARENDT, supra note 10, at 141-44.
25 See RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF
AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 63-65 (1975); THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE
WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 127-33
(1986).26 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 25, at 133-42.
27Justice Goldberg pithily made this argument in another context: "[W]hile the
Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact."
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (explaining that Congress has
broad powers to require military service).
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In short, then, the point of a revolution is to upset the constituted
order, and the way it does so is to create a revolutionary movement that
does not follow constituted modes. Across the history of this republic, a
number of significant figures have espoused the inconsistency claim. For
example, Abraham Lincoln made the inconsistency claim the central theo-
retical theme of his First Inaugural Address. Lincoln considered the se-
cession of the Southern states to be a revolution against the United States,
and he denied that the Constitution contained any such right. He admitted
that the people might have a natural right to revolution: "If, by the mere
force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly
written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify
revolution?' 28 But Lincoln carefully distinguished between constitutional
modes of change and the natural right to revolution: "Whenever [the
people] shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise
their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to
dismember, or overthrow it."29 Revolution could not be a constitutional
right because the Constitution must presuppose its own perpetual legiti-
macy:
Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law
of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no govern-
ment proper, ever had a provision in its organic law for its own
termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our
national Constitution, and the Union will endure forever-it
being impossible to destroy it, except by some action not pro-
vided for in the instrument itself.30
In other words, the purpose of revolution, to overthrow government,
contradicts the purpose of constitution, to institute perpetual government.
Any right of revolution must logically come from "outside the instrument
itself'--as, for example, from natural law. Because Lincoln had taken an
"oath registered in Heaven" to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Con-
stitution, he was honor-bound to resist all attempts at revolution. 3'
In Lincoln's view, not only were the purposes of constitution and
revolution contradictory; so too were their forms and methods. The con-
stitutional method of change involved orderly elections governed by sta-
ble, fundamental rules: "By the frame of government under which we live,
this same people have wisely given their public servants but little power
for mischief; and have, with equal wisdom, provided for the return of that
28 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 215, 219 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).29 1d. at 222.301d. at 217.311d. at 224.
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little to their own hands at very short intervals?' 32 By contrast, revolution
was an essentially lawless and therefore unconstitutional activity:
Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy.
A majority, held in restraint by constitutional checks, and limi-
tations, and always changing easily, with deliberate changes of
popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a
free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy
or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority,
as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that,
rejecting the majority principle, anarchy, or despotism in some
form is all that is left.33
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court embraced Lincoln's theory
of revolution. 34 More recently, the Court reiterated its view by rejecting
the free speech challenge of American Communists to the Smith Act. 35
The Court held perfunctorily that Congress plainly had the power to stop
revolution; the only serious question was whether it had violated the First
and Fifth Amendments by the particular antirevolutionary means that it
had chosen in the Smith Act.3 6 The Court drew a sharp distinction between
constitution, which it identified with order, and revolution, which it iden-
tified with disorder: "The obvious purpose of the statute is to protect
existing Government, not from change by peaceable, lawful and constitu-
tional means, but from change by violence, revolution and terrorism. 37
The Court was prepared to admit that there might be a right to revolution
against authoritarian governments. Even that right, however, was only
"theoretical"-meaning, apparently, that it is only a moral, not a positive
legal right. Also, the Court felt bound to put the word "right" in quotation
marks: "Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that
there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governments is without
force where the existing structure of the government provides for peaceful
and orderly change.' '38 Indeed, the Court found it virtually self-evident
that Congress must have the power to protect itself from rebellion, appar-
32 1d. at 223.
33 1d. at 220.34 See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726 (1869) (explaining that the
Constitution was intended to create a perpetual union); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FROM
CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1835-1877 at 133-34 (1973)
(discussing the doctrine of perpetual union in Texas v. White and other cases).
35Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1951) (finding that the claim that
challenged the federal law prohibiting knowing and willful advocacy of the overthrow of
the government was based on the virtue of leadership of the Communist party, rather than
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ently because the point of a constitution is to sustain a government, not
to provide for its dissolution: "That it is within the power of the Congress
to protect the Government of the United States from armed rebellion is a
proposition which requires little discussion .... No one could conceive
that it is not within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to
overthrow the Government by force and violence 39 Furthermore, accord-
ing to the Court, the methods of (orderly) constitutionalism and (anarchi-
cal) revolution are entirely at odds: "We reject any principle of govem-
mental helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution, which principle,
carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy."40
In the last year, the militia movement4 has moved the right of revo-
lution back into the national spotlight,42 and Garry Wills has strongly
advanced the inconsistency argument in his analysis of the Second Amend-
ment. According to Wills, some scholars of that amendment find in it "not
only a private right to own guns for any purpose but a public right to
oppose with arms the government of the United States" '43 Wills acknow-
ledges that Americans have a moral "right of insurrection, which clearly
does exist whenever tyranny exists. '44 Yet he denies that that right can
come from the Constitution's Second Amendment, because the purpose
of revolution is to destroy the constitution itself:
[T]he right to overthrow government is not given by government
. . . . Modern militias say the government instructs them to
overthrow government-and wacky scholars endorse this view.
They think the Constitution is so deranged a document that it
brands as the greatest crime a war against itself (in Article III:
Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying





41 For a description of the militia movement and its constitutional thinking, see David
C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with
the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879 (1996) [hereinafter Williams, The Militia Movement].42 See id. at 880.
43Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, 62, 62.
Although Wills's interest in the Second Amendment is relatively new, he has written
extensively on the revolutionary and constitutional periods. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA (1978).
44 Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 43, at 69.
45 Id. In the interest of full disclosure, I should admit that Wills names me as one of
the "wacky scholars" who embrace constitutional absurdity. See id. Actually, I have never
argued that the Constitution protects a right to revolution. I have argued that once upon a
time and under certain circumstances-not now pertaining-the Constitution protected a
right to own arms so as to be ready to make a revolution. See Williams, Civic Republi-
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Like Lincoln and the Supreme Court, Wills believes that the point of a
constitution can only be to entrench order, and the point of a revolution
can only be to overthrow that order. Moreover, the form and method of
revolution cannot be governed by constitutional norms because revolution
breaks the constitutional frame and plunges us into a world without settled
authority: "[The right to overthrow government] arises when government
no longer has authority. One cannot say one rebels by right of that
nonexistent authority."46 One can, presumably, rebel only by the authority
of natural justice, unconstrained by the regularity of constitutional proc-
ess.
An impressive lineup-one of the greatest Presidents of the United
States, the Supreme Court, and one of the most distinguished public
commentators of our time-thus unanimously agree: it is simple common
sense that a constitution cannot guarantee a right to revolution. A consti-
tution must presuppose its own legitimacy, and so it must presuppose that
no one has a right to revolt against it. Citizens may still have a right to
revolt, but that right must come from outside the document. The only
constitutional way of "responding to imperfection" 47 in the government is
by the normal processes of constitutional governance-elections and con-
stitutional amendments. 48
III. Consistency between Revolution and Constitution
A position characterized as self-evident logic by so significant an
array of figures must command respectful consideration. Yet I submit that
the apparent commonsensicality of the inconsistency claim is misleading,
canism, supra note 9. As I have tried to demonstrate, those two contentions are different
in important ways. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.46 Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 43, at 69.
47The legal issues surrounding the amendment process are themselves by no means
straightforward. For a collection of essays considering these issues, see RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford
Levinson ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1995) [hereinafter RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION].
48 John Marshall offered a similar constitutional argument in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). After tracing the origin of much American land title to
conquest of the Indian tribes, he broadly hinted that such origin of title might violate
natural justice. See id. at 591-92. Even so, if a principle is critical to a constitution's own
legitimacy (as conquest was, according to Marshall), then the constitution cannot hold that
principle illegitimate. "Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the
original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted?' Id. at 588. Accordingly,
even if the tribes had a natural right to their land, the Constitution could not recognize
that right without committing juridical suicide: "[I]f a country has been acquired and held
under [a principle]; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned." Id. at 591. For a fuller exposition
of this interpretation of Johnson, see David C. Williams, Legitimation and Statutory
Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV.
403, 411-12 (1994) [hereinafter Williams, Conquest, Consent, and Community].
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as it paints with too broad a brush. If the only options were that (1) the
Constitution protects all revolutions or (2) the Constitution protects no
revolutions, then we would perhaps have to choose the second option for
the reason that Lincoln, Wills, and others adduce: the Constitution cannot
sanction a revolt against itself. But those are not the only options.
Consistent with a presupposition of its own legitimacy, the Constitu-
tion could guarantee revolutions made to preserve the Constitution and
disallow revolutions made to overturn it. Indeed, such a distinction-pro-
tecting conservative revolutions but not others-may be more consistent
with the Constitution's presupposition of its own legitimacy than would
be a disallowance of all revolutions, because it calls upon the people to
defend the Constitution in extremis.
Originally and for many centuries, the concept of revolution referred
only to what I here call conservative revolutions: the political wheel
revolves back to its starting point, and the world witnesses a restoration
of a prior order.49 Today, the common usage of revolution may refer to
linear progress, the substitution of a wholly new order for an old and
failed one. That usage, however, rose to a position of dominance only
with the French Revolution.50 By contrast, as I will consider later, the
American War for Independence was a time of changing and multiple
meanings. The American revolutionaries sometimes described their revo-
lution as a restoration and sometimes as a substitution. 51
Implicit in the concept of a conservative revolution is the idea that
the government does not always represent the Constitution. Indeed, with-
out that idea, it would be impossible for the people to resist the govern-
ment on behalf of the Constitution, because the government and the
Constitution could not be separated. Once we recognize the possibility of
separation, however, the logical flaw in the inconsistency claim becomes
clear. When government itself seeks to subvert the Constitution, then the
government, far from representing the Constitution, actually becomes its
opponent. If the people then take up arms to defend the Constitution, their
revolution is made to protect the existing structure, not to forge a new
one. In such case, the people revolt not against the Constitution (the
advocates of which they have become) but only against the sitting gov-
ernment.
Let me return to Garry Wills's argument to illustrate this failure of
the inconsistency argument to differentiate the government and the Con-
stitution. Wills uses the term "government" to refer indiscriminately to
the Constitution and to federal officeholders. As a result, in his formula-
tion, a revolt against government is made to seem to be tautologically a
49See ARENDT, supra note 10, at 35-36.
5°See id. at 50-52.
51 See infra text accompanying notes 53-63; ARENDT, supra note 10, at 42-44.
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revolt against the Constitution. If we substitute more precise nouns, the
apparent logic of the claim disappears. Consider Wills's statement recast
in this way:
Yet the right to overthrow [federal officeholders] is not given by
[the Constitution]. It arises when [federal officeholders] no longer
halve] authority. One cannot say one rebels by right of that
nonexistent authority [of officeholders]. Modem militias say the
[Constitution] itself instructs them to overthrow [federal office-
holders]-and wacky scholars endorse this view.5 2
Implicit in the inconsistency claim, in short, is the idea that the
government is the only conceivable defender of the Constitution, that
inherent in the concept "constitution" is the notion that only officeholders
can protect it. That identity of constitution and government may be true
for some constitutions, but it is not required by the concept of a consti-
tution as such. Depending on the particular constitution's statist or popu-
list underpinnings, the people may occupy a variety of roles in its inter-
pretation and enforcement.
The Anglo-American legal tradition has endorsed the idea that some-
times the people, rather than the government, may best represent the
constitution.5 3 Locke's doctrine of resistance grows out of the idea that
when the government seeks to subvert the terms of the social contract,
then it becomes an aggressor against the people, who accordingly have a
right to resist.5 4 That idea has passed intact to more contemporary, though
perhaps less distinguished, writers-such as the leaders of the militia
movement. Thus, one pamphlet declaims: "WHEN ELECTED OFFICIALS
BREAK THEIR OATH TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, IT IS NOT
THE PATRIOTIC CITIZEN WHO IS IN REBELLION, BUT THE GOV-
ERNING OFFICIAL?' 55
57 Cf Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 43, at 69.
53
If the Federal Government should overpass the just bounds of its authority, and
make tyrannical use of its powers; the people whose creature it is must appeal to
the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done
to the constitution, as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify.
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 206 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan
Univ. Press 1961).
54 See RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS & LOCKE'S Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 296-97 (1986); LOCKE, Second Treatise, supra note 19, paras. 212-43.5 5 THE FREE MILITIA, FIELD MANUAL § 1, at 11 (1994). To be clear, I should explain
that while I believe that the militia movement is correct on this and some other points, I
also believe that they are fundamentally mistaken about the relevance of the right to keep
and bear arms to modern conditions. See Williams, The Militia Movement, supra note 41.
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Like Locke and the modem militia movement, the American revolu-
tionaries did not assume that only formal government could defend the
constitution. Quite the contrary, they cast the British government as the
aggressor against the social contract,56 and they saw themselves-infor-
mal committees of correspondence and inspection, ultra vires Continental
Congresses 57-as the true protectors of the British imperial constitution.58
Indeed, in its early stages, to a significant extent, the American Revolution
was a conservative revolution of precisely the sort that I am describing.
To be sure, some revolutionaries maintained that they were exercising a
natural right to revolution to protect their other natural rights.59 But a large
number of revolutionary leaders saw themselves as constitutional conser-
vatives reacting to the aggressive behavior of the British Crown and
Parliament.
Their constitutional grievances were of three sorts. First, they be-
lieved that they were entitled to the benefit of English law and the rights
of Englishmen, but the British government was attempting to govern them
through arbitrary power.60 Second, they believed that Parliament had no
right to govern their internal affairs or to tax them.61 Third, they believed
that the king was seeking to disrupt the traditional balance of estates by
bribing Members of Parliament and colonial legislators with places, pen-
sions, and perquisites.62 Eventually, the revolutionaries would declare in-
dependence of the king and so leave the empire altogether. Even then,
however, they would for a time seek to preserve what they believed to be
the essence of the British constitutional structure, now transposed to the
other side of the Atlantic: their new constitutions enshrined what the
revolutionaries took to be the traditional rights of Englishmen, 63 and they
created state governments modeled on the traditional balance of estates. 64
56See RAKOVE, supra note 24, at 81; GORDON S. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 268-71 (1969).57 See RAKOVE, supra note 24, at 65.
58There is considerable disagreement on whether the revolutionaries were right about
their constitutional claims, but there is no serious dispute about the fact that they portrayed
themselves as faithful to the constitution. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND
CENTER (1986); WOOD, supra note 56, at 10-13; Barbara Black, The Constitution of
Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157 (1976).
59Whether to invoke natural law or constitutional law or both was one of the first
debates entertained by the First Continental Congress. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 24,
at 54.
6
°See BAILYN, supra note 58, at 77-79; GREENE, supra note 58, at 23-28.61See BAILYN, supra note 58, at 202-29; Black, supra note 58, at 1157-1211; see
also RAKOVE, supra note 24, at 58-59.62See BAILYN, supra note 58, at 124-25, 131-33; Williams, Civic Republicanism,
supra note 9, at 567-68.63 See WOOD, supra note 56, at 271.
64See id. at 197-214. That transposition followed an old pattern for the colonists.
They had sought to model their governments on England's, claiming that the imperial
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I do not argue that the American revolutionaries never sought to
change the British constitution. Eventually, they self-consciously did so
in a variety of ways. For example, they created new, more thoroughly
republican legislatures, 65 and they sought to protect natural rights, rather
than the traditional rights of Englishmen.66 Nor do I argue that the framers
of the Constitution in fact sought to guarantee a right of conservative
revolution in 1787. But I do argue that they could have sought to do so,
without incoherence, insensibility, or profound inconsistency with their
own ideological heritage. They knew from personal experience that gov-
ernment and constitution are not identical concepts, that government can
wage war on the constitution, and that sometimes the citizenry is the
constitution's only hope.
This distinction between government and constitution specifically
addresses both the purpose-inconsistency argument and the form-incon-
sistency argument. The response to the former is fairly simple: the pur-
pose of a conservative revolution is to protect the constitution against
invasion by the government, not to create a new politico-legal order. The
revolution arises from an unremedied constitutional grievance, and the
goal is to satisfy that grievance by reinstalling the constitutional regime.
In this sense, a constitutional right of revolution is the opposite of the
"suicide note" described by the inconsistency argument: it is instead a
guarantee that the constitution should have multiple protectors-the gov-
ernment in ordinary times, the citizenry in extraordinary ones.
The response to the form-inconsistency claim is slightly more com-
plicated. This claim supposes that when the people take arms against
government, the constitution is by definition dissolved, and the nation has
entered a state of nature. Again, that formulation poses the options too
simply, as polar opposites: we are either in a regime of normal govern-
ment or in the state of nature. In fact, there is a continuum between those
two points, forms of civil association that are neither governmental nor
wholly atomistic. It is possible for a constitution to govern at least some
of that continuum, even when the conventional government no longer
holds authority. For such a situation to hold, of course, the particular
constitution would have to include, implicitly or explicitly, a set of norms
constitution sanctioned this home-rule arrangement. See GREENE, supra note 58, at 31-32.
Formal independence from Great Britain and formation of the Articles of Confederation
may therefore have changed the form of the constitution, as the revolutionaries sensed,
see RAKOVE, supra note 24, at 81-83, 139-41, but perhaps not its basic principles. Charles
Fried has argued that the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation
were constitutional because they both rested on state authority under old charters. The
early republic did not cleanly break with preexisting legal authority until the Constitution
of 1787, with its derivation of authority from the people of the United States, rather than
from the states. See Fried, supra note 10, at 19-24.65See BAILYN, supra note 58, at 272-301.66See id. at 184-89.
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governing how a revolution should be carried out. Many constitutions
contain no such norms; they assume that a revolution in fact does initiate
a state of nature. But that assumption is implicit only in particular con-
stitutions, not in the concept of constitutionalism itself. Indeed, nothing
prevents the framers of a constitution from specifying with great detail
the methods and forms that patriots should follow in the event of govern-
mental assault on the constitution. 67
The Lockean tradition provides an important example of the idea that
even when the bonds between government and people are severed, the
people do not necessarily lapse into a preconstitutional state. Locke de-
scribed not one but two social contracts-the popular contract and the
rectoral contract. 68 First, the people contracted among themselves to create
society; in this contract, individuals consented to form a single collective
body to be ruled by the will of the majority.69 Society then contracted
with government to create a particular form of commonwealth, delegating
certain powers but also placing limits on them.70 The making and the
breaking of these contracts were separate and independent issues. Locke
begins his chapter on the dissolution of government: "He that will with
any clearness speak of the Dissolution of Government, ought, in the first
place to distinguish between the Dissolution of the Society, and the Dis-
solution of the Government."71 The formation of society is more funda-
mental than the formation of government, and its dissolution can generally
occur only upon foreign invasion:
That which makes the Community, and brings Men out of the
loose State of Nature, into one Politick Society, is the Agreement
which every one has with the rest to incorporate, and act as one
Body, and so be one distinct Commonwealth. The usual, and
almost only way whereby this Union is dissolved, is the Inroad
of Foreign Force making a Conquest upon them.72
67Akhil Reed Amar addresses a similar objection to his proposed popular amendment
process with a similar response. The objection says: "Perhaps the people do have a right
to alter or abolish their government outside Article V, but this right is not a legal right, a
constitutional right. It is something else-supra-constitutional, extralegal, natural, philo-
sophical, or revolutionary, perhaps, but definitely not legal and constitutional in the way
that Article V is" Amar, supra note 10, at 499. Amar's response: "Why not? Surely the
Constitution could have said, in so many words: 'Article V is not exclusive. The People
retain the legal right to change the Constitution."' Id.
68I borrow the terms from EDMUND MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 109 (1988).




When society is so dissolved, so necessarily is government, because the
latter is dependent on the former.73
By contrast, government may be dissolved while society remains
intact. Locke explains: "Besides this over-turning from without, Govern-
ments are dissolved from within"74 when government betrays its trust, in
various ways that Locke describes in detail.75 When the government dis-
solves, power "reverts to the Society [not disconnected individuals], and
the People have a Right to act as Supreme, and continue the Legislative
in themselves, or erect a new Form, or under the old form place it in new
hands, as they think good.'' 76 Society continues even after the dissolution
of government "[f]or the Society can never, by the fault of another, lose
the Native and Original Right it has to preserve it self.'"77 Indeed, the
community was created to be perpetual:
The Power that every individual gave the Society, when he
entered into it, can never revert to the Individuals again, as long
as the Society lasts, but will always remain in the Community;
because without this, there can be no Community, no Common-
wealth, which is contrary to the original Agreement. 78
By contrast, the contract with government was meant to continue only so
long as the government remains true to the terms of the contract. 79 In
short, "the Community may be said in this respect to be always the
Supream Power, but not as considered under any Form of Government,
because this Power of the People can never take place till the Government
be dissolved."80 Thus, even if the rectoral contract has been dissolved, the
people are not thereby hurled back into a prepolitical state. Rather, they
are still parties to the civil contract and so still governed by a consensual
body of rules, such as the commitment to act as a single body subject to
majority rule. The people so constituted are able to resist government,
conduct a revolution, and reinstate the preexisting relationship between
government and citizens, all without ever leaving the domain of constitu-
tional norms."
73 See id.
74 1d. at para. 212.
75See id. at paras. 212-39.761d. at para. 243.
77Id. at para. 220.
78 Id. at para. 243.
79 See id. at para. 243.
801d. at para. 149.
81 Locke scholars disagree on whether dissolution of the rectoral but not the popular
contract necessarily returns the people to a state of nature. Compare ASHCRAFT, supra note
54, at 575-76 (people in state of nature), with JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JOHN LOCKE 181 (1969) (people not in state of nature); JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, JOHN LOCKE
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Later social contractarians continued to rely on this dual contract
theory to explain revolutionary action in the absence of government.8 2
Radical pamphleteers, for example, analyzed the 1689 Convention Parlia-
ment in these terms: the contract between James II and the people of
Great Britain had been dissolved, but the people (or, more correctly, their
representatives) continued to meet to forge a new contract with William
and Mary.83 In Hannah Arendt's view, the American colonies histori-
cally-not merely metaphorically-began in popular contracts, mutual
promises more fundamental than the contract with government. Accord-
ingly, when the revolutionaries severed the ties with Great Britain, they
did not thereby reenter the state of nature; instead, power reverted to the
local assemblies, duly constituted by the original civil contracts, that in
turn created a new American government. Further, because of this conti-
nuity in constituted order, the American revolution never degenerated into
lawlessness and violence in the way that the French Revolution did. 84
The form-inconsistency argument supposes that this middle ground
between the individual and the state is barren, that once the state dis-
solves, no other social forms remain to provide constitutional structure. 85
AND THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY 107 (1978) (people not in state of nature); Peter
Laslett, Introduction, JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 114-15 (Peter Laslett
ed., 2d ed. 1967) (Locke confused, but people not in state of nature), and MORGAN, supra
note 68, at 119-20 (Locke just confused), and MARTIN SELIGER, THE LIBERAL POLITICS
OF JOHN LOCKE 105 (1968) (people not in state of nature). This disagreement seems to
grow out of two elements: first, when government but not society has been dissolved, the
political situation becomes complex and difficult to categorize; second, Locke himself is
inconsistent in his usage of the phrase "state of nature:' The two elements are related. On
the one hand, Locke sometimes states that individuals leave the state of nature by the
creation of common "umpirage" in the legislature, see LOCKE, Second Treatise, supra note
19, at paras. 89, 125, 227; correlatively, he sometimes suggests that with the dissolution
of the legislature, the people are cast back into the state of nature, see id. at paras. 121,
219-220. On the other hand, Locke sometimes states that people leave the state of nature
by the commitment to live as one Body governed by majority will, rather than to live as
individuals governed by the Law of Nature, see id. at paras. 128, 211. Correlatively, with
the dissolution of government, the people are in a state of nature (indeed a state of war)
toward the government, see id. at para. 227, but not toward one another, see id. at para.
243. For present purposes, this disagreement is largely semantic. Even if the people do
return to a state of nature, it is not the same state of nature that they occupied as
individuals. They have perpetually bound themselves to live together under majority rule.
Therefore, when they make a revolution, they do so as a political society constituted by
fundamental contractual obligations, rather than as loose individuals linked only by the
obligations of natural law. See, e.g., ASHCRAFT, supra note 54, at 576-77, 584-85 (arguing
that the people have reverted to the state of nature but conceding that they are still bound
into a common majoritarian body unlike the original state of nature).
82See ARENDT, supra note 10, at 169-71.83See MORGAN, supra note 68, at 108-10, 119. According to Morgan, this view of
the Convention Parliament became retrospectively orthodox by the era of Walpole. See id.
at 120.84See ARENDT, supra note 10, at 165-72.
85 This supposition is by no means new. Indeed, in the 18th century, royalists used
essentially the same argument to reject any doctrine of revolution: once one allows any
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If that supposition were correct, then insurrection could lead only to
unrestricted civil war, not to constitutional revolution. This supposition
seems to proceed from a set of individualist Hobbesian premises that have
become common in the late twentieth century: humans are essentially
separate; individuals inevitably try to maximize their own utility, with
scant regard for the good of others except as it benefits themselves; they
do not and cannot exhibit spontaneous sociability; socialization cannot
make people altruistic; and only the coercive hand of government can
maintain the market rules necessary to keep individuals from oppressing
each other in the pursuit of their separate goods. 86 Those premises may
be plausible for explaining certain phenomena like the international mar-
ket. As a complete explanation of human nature, however, they are plainly
inadequate.87 In recent years, as the social consequences of extreme indi-
vidualism have generated concern, many have argued that reviving "civil
society"--that sphere of social life intermediate between the state and
individuals, such as the market, culture, private associations, and coffee
houses-might help to create a more cohesive polity.88 More importantly
for present purposes, many constitutionalists of the eighteenth century
placed great store in the ability of humans to create such a sphere of civil
society.89 In addition, the premises of the form-inconsistency argument are
simply inconsistent with the fact that, at least in their early phases, some
resistance to formal government, Hobbesian anarchy and chaos inevitably follow, because
there is no middle ground. See ASHcRAFr, supra note 54, at 293-94.86These assumptions are perhaps most evident in the writings of some practitioners
of neoclassical economics, public choice theory, and law and economics. See, e.g., FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 13, 17-18
(1995) (economic life is deeply embedded in social life); Steven E. Rhoads, Do Econo-
mists Overemphasize Monetary Benefits?, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 815 (1985) (economists
generally overemphasize the importance of money as a human motive and as a source of
happiness).87See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 86, at 19-21 (explaining the descriptive inade-
quacy of these extreme individualist premises); Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and
Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985) (economic
action is embeddded in structure of social relations); Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 317
(1977) (the modem economic view of man is stylized to answer the question of whether
egoistic behavior can achieve public good).
88See E.J. DIONNE, JR., THEY ONLY LOOK DEAD: WHY PROGRESSIVES WILL DoMl-
NATE THE NEXT POLITICAL ERA 295-99 (1996); FUKUYAMA, supra note 86, at 4-5; THE
REEMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION (Zbigniew
Rau ed., 1991); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF
A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY (1992)
(discussing the attraction of civil society but ultimately rejecting it as a solution for
modern problems).
89 See ARENDT, supra note 10, at 166-74; Stephen A. Conrad, The Rhetorical Constitu-
tion of "Civil Society" at the Founding: One Lawyer's Anxious Vision, 72 IND. L.J. 335
(1997); Jack P. Greene, Response-Civil Society and the American Founding, 72 IND. L.J.
375 (1997).
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revolutionary movements did exhibit great cohesion, quite without the
framework of government. 90
Particular societies may lack the functional equivalent of a social
contract among the people, and for those societies, a constitutional revo-
lution may be a practical impossibility. But constitutional revolution is
impossible only under such circumstances; it is not conceptually impos-
sible everywhere and at all times. The idea of a revolutionary movement
governed by the constitution does presuppose that the people can directly
listen to the still, small voice of the constitution amid the din of war, even
without the government telling them what that voice is saying. And as
with purpose, so with form, that idea rests on a populist notion of con-
stitutional governance. Some constitutions may not be so populist, but
some may be.
In America today, the people's chief rival for such constitutional
authority is not the executive or legislative branches but the Supreme
Court. Indeed, the Court has sometimes described itself as the ultimate
arbiter of constitutional meaning, 91 and many obviously regard it as so.
The salience of the Court as coristitutional interpreter does not, however,
mean that our Constitution could not contain a right of popular revolution
against the government. First, the Court's supremacy as constitutional
expositor is not and never has been uncontroverted. 92 Second, even if the
Court has traditionally been the supreme interpreter of the Constitution,
it still might join with the people in a revolution against the rest of
government; indeed, the Court could actually be the instigator of revolu-
tion. After all, the conception of courts "speaking truth to power" 93 is
well-established in Anglo-American and other legal traditions. 94 Most
memorably, Edward Coke played an important part in the background for
one revolution in England 95 and provided much of the constitutional in-
spiration for another across the Atlantic.96
Finally, suppose that the Court is the exclusive interpreter of the
Constitution in normal times, and suppose even further that during a
revolution the Court either no longer sits or else condemns the revolution.
90 See RAKOVE, supra note 24, at 109-10; WOOD, supra note 56, at 102.
91See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) ("[T]he basic principle [is] that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution").92 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 37-53 (1988) (arguing that
many important American thinkers have always disagreed with the idea of judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation).93 ROBERT COVER, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 173, 186 (1995).94See id. at 178-201.
95See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 119-21 (1968); WILLIAM
F. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA: LEGEND AND LEGACY 166-207 (1965).




In such a case, it is still not inevitable that the revolution be unconstitu-
tional since judicial supremacy may apply only in normal times, not
revolutionary ones. It would be coherent to imagine the doctrine of con-
stitutional interpretation thus: the people made the Constitution and com-
mitted it to the Court for safekeeping during settled times, but they
reserved to themselves the ultimate right to protect it during times of
governmental faithlessness which the Court could not or would not con-
trol.97
The fact that constitutional revolutions are possible in theory does
not mean that they are likely or even desirable in practice. In particular,
the violence that is part of their definition makes it likely that revolutions
will become anarchic, divisive, and ungoverned by constitutional norms.
Hannah Arendt powerfully expressed the contradiction between violence
and politics of any sort:
Where violence rules absolutely, as for instance in the concen-
tration camps of totalitarian regimes, not only the laws ... but
everything and everybody must fall silent. It is because of this
silence that violence is a marginal phenomenon in the political
realm; for man, to the extent that he is a political being, is
endowed with the power of speech.98
This worry about violence may be part of the animating concern of the
inconsistency claim as well. Americans like to imagine that the Constitu-
tion provides some guarantee of justice, of government by consent, of
minimal political decency.99 By contrast, in revolution, the sword prevails,
and there is no guarantee that the just will win. Therefore, constitution
97That doctrine would also be consistent with (though not demanded by) some
weighty case law. In announcing the principle of judicial review, John Marshall explained:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future governance,
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness,
is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise
of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be
frequently repeated. The principles, therefore so established, are deemed funda-
mental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom
act, they are designed to be permanent.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). The people, in other words, create the
Constitution, but then because they are seldom able to act, they leave it alone, in the care
of the judiciary. There remains always the possibility, however, that they would undertake
the "very great exertion" of that "original right" again.
98 ARENDT, supra note 10, at 18-19.
99 At times, this veneration seems to become a civil religion. See Thomas C. Grey,
The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1, 21-25 (1984); Sanford Levinson, "The
Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 123, 123-25 (1979).
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and revolution must be contradictory because revolution stands for vio-
lence and constitution for reason.
That formulation, however, once more overstates the distinction be-
tween revolution and constitution. While the Constitution might rest in
part on justice and consent, it also has rested in part on oppression and
injustice. For example, the Constitution acquired jurisdiction over Ameri-
can Indians, African-Americans, other involuntary immigrants, and women
without their consent, and for many years exercised jurisdiction over them
without allowing them representation. °00 Indeed, every state and, there-
fore, every constitution ultimately rests on some degree of coercion.101
And just as constitutions can be less than wholly peaceful, revolutions
can be less than wholly violent. Again, Hannah Arendt phrases the point
powerfully:
To be sure, not even wars, let alone revolutions, are ever com-
pletely determined by violence .... Because of [its] speechless-
ness political theory has little to say about the phenomenon of
violence and must leave its discussion to the technicians .... A
theory of war or a theory of revolution, therefore, can only deal
with the justification of violence because this justification con-
stitutes its political limitation.10 2
In short, constitutionalism-like other political theory-can provide a
limit on the justification of violence. While there can be no guarantee that
revolutions will heed that limit, there is no certainty that they will not
either. In any event, without an articulation of limits, revolutionary vio-
lence is more likely to become simply anarchic.
IV. Limits on a Constitutional Right to Revolution
The inconsistency argument is thus mistaken in claiming that revolu-
tion and constitution are always in contradiction. Nonetheless, the argu-
ment does suggest a number of conceptual limits on any constitutional
right to revolution. Many of these limits are implicit in the foregoing, but
it is worth enumerating and elaborating them to show just how significant
they are. Taken together, these limits may be so severe that few if any
real-world revolutions could satisfy them. In practice, armed resistance to
'
0 0 See Williams, Conquest, Consent, and Community, supra note 48, at 416-29.
10 1 See ROBERT M. COVER, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95, 155-63 (1995); BRUCE D. PORTER, WAR AND
THE RISE OF THE STATE: THE MILITARY FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICS (1994).102 ARENDT, supra note 10, at 18-19.
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government may be so untamable that it inevitably jumps the constitu-
tionalist fence into the field of unfettered normative argument.
The purpose-inconsistency argument places two conceptual limits on
any constitutional right to revolution. First, the revolution must arise from
a genuine constitutional grievance-for example, the government must be
engaged in a sustained attack on the constitution, and the revolution must
respond to that attack. Second, the long-term goal of the revolution must
be the restoration of the preexisting constitutional order, not the substitu-
tion of some new form of government.103
The form-inconsistency claim places several additional conceptual
limits on a constitutional right of revolution. First, the constitution must,
implicitly or explicitly, prescribe governing rules for the conduct of a
revolution; second, the revolution must follow those rules. As to the first,
probably very few constitutions-perhaps none-overtly detail how a
revolution should be conducted. But if a constitution does guarantee a
right of revolution, it would seem reasonable to infer the constitutional
forms for revolution by making analogies to the constitutional forms for
ordinary government. For example, it is entirely implausible that the U.S.
Constitution would recognize a revolution conducted by a revolutionary
dictatorship. Instead, an American constitutional revolutionary movement
would have to exhibit, to some degree, the elements central to our con-
stitutional tradition: democracy, federalism, separation of powers, and
individual liberty. As revolutions create exigent times, the Constitution
might not require a revolutionary movement to exhibit those elements to
the same degree as in more settled times-just as the Constitution allows
the government more flexibility during exigent, nonrevolutionary times. 104
But constitutional flexibility is not the same as constitutional desuetude.10 s
103The Declaration of Independence overtly violated this limit. It relied not on a
constitutional right of revolution but on a right secured by "nature and ... nature's God"
when it declared the right of the people to start anew-to "alter or abolish" oppressive
government, and to "institute new government, laying it's [sic) foundation on such
principles, & organizing it's [sic] powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely
to effect their safety & happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776).
'°4See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("[C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may some-
times, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures of independent
presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of
law.").
105Akhil Amar describes an analogous process in the context of constitutional amend-
ment. He argues that Article V specifies only the process that government must follow to
initiate constitutional amendments; the people, by contrast, are free to amend the Consti-
tution by simple majority vote. See Amar, supra note 10, at 458. The Constitution,
however, does not even mention, let alone specify procedures for this alternative amend-
ment process. At one point, Amar recognizes the difficulty in defining such procedures but
then evades offering a solution: "Of course in implementing either Amendment path,
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Both the form-inconsistency and the purpose-inconsistency arguments
create limits inherent in the concept of constitutionalism, so they would
apply to all constitutional revolutions. In addition, particular constitutions
might also prescribe additional limits on any local right of constitutional
revolution. For example, I have argued elsewhere that the Second Amend-
ment's right to arms applies only to a civic republican citizenry, charac-
terized by a high degree of civic virtue and homogeneity and organized
into a universal militia.106 Without these features, the right to possess arms
to make a revolution becomes meaningless in its own terms-and so
presumably would any implicit constitutional right to make a revolution
with those arms.
Two issues problematize the exact scope of all of these limits: con-
stitutional change and constitutional interpretation. All constitutions change,
and many of them do so according to processes prescribed by the consti-
tutions themselves. In the U.S. Constitution, for example, Article V pre-
scribes supermajoritarian steps for making amendments. By hypothesis,
the Constitution itself recognizes and regulates this form of change, and
so we might call it internal change. In contrast is external change, change
forced on the Constitution by the power of events from without, against
the constitution's will. To illustrate, the Nineteenth Amendment, passed
according to Article V's formal procedures after prolonged nationwide
debate, is a clear product of internal change. By contrast, the forcible
suspension of the Constitution by a military coup d'etat would be the
product of external change.
Constitutional revolutions must be essentially conservative, in the
sense that they must seek to preserve the constitutional structure intact,
but they need not be static: they may in fact change the constitutional
faithful constitutional interpreters will confront a host of difficult questions ... .I leave
these implementation issues for another day." Amar, supra note 10, at 500. At another
point, however, he imagines the following overt version of his proposed reading of the
Constitution: "The [pleople retain the legal right to change the Constitution by legal
mechanisms akin to the legal mechanisms by which they ordained and established it." Id.
at 499 (emphasis added). Later, Amar suggests that we could develop procedures, borrow-
ing from judicial models and updating the old convention process, to ensure an adequately
deliberative process. He observes: "There thus remains considerable room for flexibility
in implementing the deliberation requirement." See id. at 503. Charles Fried's objection
to this implicit amendment process is as relevant to an implicit revolution process:
It is not just a cavil to ask who exactly would set up this extraordinarily complex
encounter of the whole citizenry, and who and what would be authorized to
mobilize the people in such a way. We can conjure spirits from the vasty deep,
but will they come when we do call them?
Fried, supra note 10, at 30.106See Williams, Civic Republicanism, supra note 9, at 588-96 (arguing that the right




structure as long as they do so according to the constitution's own norms
for change. Revolutions often occur during times of considerable consti-
tutional change; they may cause further constitutional change; and they
may themselves be constitutionally significant events. As a result, the
constitution might be very different before and after the revolution. But
such change does not mean that the revolution necessarily departed from
constitutional terrain. Instead, all of that change may have occurred ac-
cording to the constitution's internal rules. Furthermore, the constitution's
internal rules for change during revolutionary times may be more permis-
sive than its rules for change during settled times. 107 As a result, consti-
tutional change may occur thick and fast during a revolution, and it may
often seem that the constitution poses few real limits on a revolution.
Indeed, the difference between the people creating new government under
a natural right of revolution, and the people following processes of con-
stitutional change under a constitutional right of revolution, may all but
disappear from the perspective of those engaged in the change.
Similarly, issues of constitutional interpretation may render the limits
on constitutional revolution somewhat problematic. In a diverse nation
such as ours, disagreement on the meaning of the Constitution is perhaps
inevitable-not only over its substantive content, but even over the appro-
priate interpretive technique to divine that substantive content.10 8 During
settled times, the existence of a semiauthoritative interpreter such as the
Supreme Court might help to cabin that disagreement.10 9 During revolu-
tionary times, however, such an interpreter may be relatively less avail-
able, as, by definition, the people have taken power back into their own
hands and the normal structure of government has been disrupted. 10
It is important not to overstate the differences between normal times
and revolutionary ones on this score. Even during normal times, in this
country, the existence of the Supreme Court does not forestall vigorous,
even violent, disagreement on the Constitution's meaning. Again, the
status of the Supreme Court as the Constitution's authoritative exponent
is itself a point of constitutional interpretation, on which there exists
significant disagreement."' Furthermore, during revolutionary times, the
107 For example, Akhil Amar's claim that the people may at any time change the
Constitution by majority vote, see supra note 105, has, perhaps, more resonance during
revolutionary activity than during other periods.
'
0SSee Williams, The Militia Movement, supra note 41, at 940-42 (arguing that
epistemological disagreement over constitutional interpretation is inevitable).
109 See LEVINSON, supra note 92, at 37 (discussing this viewpoint).
"t0 In this sense, in Sanford Levinson's terms, revolution may be the ultimate "prot-
estant" constitutional activity. See LEVINSON, supra note 92, at 37-53 (elucidating a
theoretical framework of constitutional "protestantism" in which each citizen is not bound
by the interpretation of courts, but determines the correct meaning of the Constitution for
herself).
I See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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Court may continue to sit as the people's constitutional court,"12 or an
alternative tribunal-like the Continental Congresses-may arise to cabin
constitutional controversy.' 13 As a result, the revolutionary movement may
be relatively unified on the meaning of the constitution.
Even so, disagreement on the constitution's meaning will typically
be more severe during revolutionary times. Even if the revolutionary
movement is itself unified, there are always two sides in a revolution,
those allied with the rebels and those allied with the government. Both
may see themselves as protectors of the constitution, but neither recog-
nizes political relations with the other or with an overarching political
authority. As a result, resolution of the controversy by settled institutional
mechanisms is not possible. Indeed, the American Revolution and the
Civil War may both have become inevitable when one or both sides
realized that agreement on a neutral tribunal or a neutral decisional pro-
cedure was not possible.
The problems of constitutional change and constitutional interpretation
are most acute when they go hand in hand and compound each other. In
such cases, the issue in contention is the interpretation of how constitu-
tional change occurs and whether it has occurred. This coincidence of the
problems of constitutional change and interpretation was at the heart of
the transatlantic dispute leading to American independence in the 1770s. The
British imperial constitution plainly was changing during the eighteenth
century, and all sensed the drift. Disagreement occurred, however, not
only on the nature of the change but also on how the change could occur,
and the twentieth century has not seen a resolution of the controversy) 4
At the most general level, Americans and Britons disagreed on whether
(1) the constitution could limit Parliamentary innovation or (2) Parliamentary
power was of its nature unlimited. In the process, the colonists and the
home country came to very different definitions of constitution-for the
former, a series of prescriptive "higher law" limits on government, for the
latter a simple description of the structure of extant government."' Both
ideas were relatively new, but each side defended its favored theory as
the current state of the British constitution."16 From this basic division,
U2 See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
113For a description of the remarkable early authority of the Continental Congresses,
see RAKOVE, supra note 24, at 32-41, 66-69, 71, 108-09.
114 Compare CHARLES MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1923) (sympathetic to the Americans' case); Black, supra note 58, at
1207-11, and GREENE, supra note 58, with Julius Goebel, Book Review, 30 COLUM. L.
R~v. 273 (1930) (unsympathetic to the Americans' case), and ROBERT SHUYLER, PARLIA-
MENT AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE (1927) (historical justification of British jurisdiction over
colonies).115See BAILYN, supra note 58, at 175-84; WOOD, supra note 56, at 259-68; Black,
supra note 58, at 1172-75.
116 See BAILYN, supra note 58, at 189-91 (relative novelty of the colonists' view),
200-02 (relative novelty of idea of Parliamentary omnipotence).
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opinion fractured into a variety of more subtle distinctions. Eighteenth
century and/or modem commentators have taken the following views on
when, exactly, the American revolution stopped being constitutional:
1. The American revolution violated the British constitution as soon
as it denied Parliamentary supremacy, because by 1770, the essence of
the constitution had become Parliamentary omnipotence." 7
2. By 1776, the essence of the constitution had become or was
moving toward legislative home rule for many of the units of the Empire,
all united in allegiance to the British crown. The American revolution
therefore violated the British constitution when it announced independence
from the British crown in 1776.118
3. By 1776, the essence of the constitution was the local charters
granting home rule to the individual colonies, which later became states.
The American Revolution therefore violated the British constitution not
when it announced independence from George Il but when the Constitu-
tion of 1787 derived its power from the people, rather than the states.119
4. By 1776, the essence of the constitution was mixed government
and the traditional rights of Englishmen. The American Revolution there-
fore violated the British constitution not when it derived power from the
people but when it embraced wholly democratic government and natural
rights without regard to their traditional underpinnings.1 20
Doubtless there are many other possible views as well. Despite their
substantive differences, these positions all purport to be interpretations of
the new state of the British constitution in the late eighteenth century.
Without an authoritative interpreter, we will probably never have a defini-
tive interpretation-and without such an interpretation, it is difficult to
discern the exact limits that constitutionality placed on the Revolution of
1776.
Even today, Americans interpret the nature of legitimate constitu-
tional change differently. According to some elements of the modern
militia movement, the "true" Constitution forbids a federal income tax
and limits full citizenship to white males, because the Fourteenth, Fif-
teenth, and Sixteenth Amendments were not enacted according to proper
constitutional procedures.121 Within the legal academy, the amendment
process has recently become a subject of considerable controversy.122
Article V lays out a complicated, supermajoritarian process that any amend-
ment must survive. Akhil Amar has argued, however, that Article V pre-
scribes only those steps that government must take to amend the Consti-
17 See Black, supra note 58, at 1203-07.
118See id., at 1200-03.
n
9gSee Fried, supra note 10, at 19-27.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
121See Williams, The Militia Movement, supra note 41, at 929-31, 937-40.
122 For a collection of essays illustrating the range of the present debate, see RESPOND-
ING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 47.
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tution; the people, by contrast, may meet at any time in convention and
change the Constitution by simple majority vote. 2 3 Bruce Ackerman of-
fers a different route for amendment outside of Article V: the meaning of
the Constitution can de facto change at those rare moments when the
people engage in prolonged, self-conscious, deliberative constitutional
discourse, and all three branches of government concur in a fundamental
shift. 124 Charles Fried pointedly rejects both of these views, arguing that
Article V is the only route for constitutional amendment. 25 Again, despite
their diversity, all these arguments share one important feature: they all
purport to be explanations of the Constitution's own mechanisms for
internal change.
In practice, then, the conceptual limits on constitutional revolution
may prove to be obscure because of the uncertainties involved in consti-
tutional change and interpretation. In theory, however, the limits are quite
severe: constitutional revolutions must arise from a constitutional griev-
ance, seek only the restoration of the constitutional order, take only
constitutional forms, and instigate change only according to constitutional
rules interpreted according to constitutional techniques. Probably no revo-
lution in history has ever satisfied these stringent requirements. Indeed,
there may be something in the dynamics of revolutionary movements that
causes them to break these bounds. While revolutionaries may aspire to
constitutionalism during the early, resistance phase of a revolution, they
usually abandon it by the reconstruction phase.
In short, then, the claim that some revolutions might be constitutional
would seem to have little significance in the real world. On the one hand,
constitutional limits will be very difficult to satisfy in theory. On the other
hand, those limits will be highly flexible-perhaps even illusory-in prac-
tice. Would it then be best simply to conclude that even if theoretically a
constitution might guarantee a right of revolution, such a right must be
so narrow and ambiguous as to have very little importance?
Conclusion
Despite the problems enumerated above, the recognition of a consti-
tutional right to revolution might have several important consequences.
First, constitutional discourse is, at least theoretically, tethered to a par-
ticular legal framework, however ambiguous. This framework might sup-
ply some important intellectual discipline for loose talk about revolution:
to exercise a constitutional right of revolution, one must persuasively
claim to have satisfied all of the foregoing requirements. Such discipline
123 See Amar, supra note 10, at 458-59.
'
24See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991).
125See Fried, supra note 10, at 27-33.
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would be particularly important in the early, resistance phase of revolu-
tions when many revolutionaries are concerned with preserving continuity
with the old order. By comparison, discussion of revolution predicated on
a natural right to revolution can be remarkably imprecise and unfocused.
For example, many writers vociferously argue that the Second Amend-
ment protects a popular right to own arms so as to make a revolution, but
these same writers become resoundingly silent on when and how a revo-
lution might legitimately occur. 26 Apparently, the People, in their instinc-
tive wisdom, will just know by consulting their sense of abstract right.127
Second, if revolution is a natural right, constitutionalizing that right
could help to reduce schism during revolutionary times by providing a
common frame of reference. At best, this frame may help to preserve
some degree of connection between the contending sides in a revolution.
For example, revolutionary moderates hoped to keep open the possibility
of a formal alliance with Great Britain by limiting their pleas to a resto-
ration of the constitutional status quo ante.1S8 Similarly, the Civil War
might have been delayed by the fact that both sides claimed to be acting
within basic constitutional principles, however differently they may have
understood them; after the war, that common framework may also have
facilitated the reintegration of the Confederate states back into the Union.
Even when government and revolutionaries are irreconcilably divided,
preservation of a constitutional framework may help to promote unity
within the revolutionary movement itself. Once the movement leaves
constitutional terrain for the more open fields of natural equity, everything
is up for grabs, and submerged differences may become all too appar-
ent. 129
The first two benefits of a constitutional right of revolution focus on
the advantages of stability and continuity-the qualities that a constitution
can bring to revolution. By contrast, the third benefit focuses on the
benefits that revolution can bring to a constitution. However limited its
significance as a practical matter, recognition of a constitutional right to
12 6 See Williams, The Militia Movement, supra note 41, at 911-15.
1271 call this phenomenon "conjuring with the people" and I examine it at greater
length in Williams, The Militia Movement, supra note 41. Glenn Harlan Reynolds alone
has sought to introduce into Second Amendment scholarship some discussion of when a
revolution might be justified. In particular, he has argued, echoing Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951), that revolution would never be justified as long as democratic
redress at the polls is possible. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. Rav. 461, 505-07 (1995). What is most remarkable about
Reynolds's work, however, is that his call for a discussion of standards has not been
answered by others working in the field.
128 See RAKOVE, supra note 24, at 54, 71-72, 141.
129For example, the colonists were united as long as they were concerned about
Britain's assault on what they regarded as their constitutional liberties. See RAKOVE, supra
note 24, at 107-10. Upon independence, as they had to design new governments, the
Americans fell into rancorous disagreement. See id. at 119-26.
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revolution would be important as a symbol of the continuing importance
of revolutionary principles, such as the legitimacy of direct popular action
to prompt rapid political change. Popular recognition of a natural right
of revolution is easy to distance from present circumstances-an abstract
acknowledgment only that all people have a right to resist tyranny. By
contrast, recognition of a constitutional right of revolution is an assertion
that Americans all presently have a legal, affirmative right to overthrow
unconstitutional government, and that right is part of what constitutes
them a nation.
That recognition might help to restore the idea of revolution to the
American political vocabulary. From early in our history, prominent Ameri-
cans have engaged in revisionist histories of the War for Independence to
minimize its revolutionary quality. 130 In this century, America, the nation
founded in revolution, has notoriously become the most antirevolutionary
major power, except when it is cynically promoting foreign insurgency
movements for its own interests. 131 And when would-be revolutionaries
have tried to claim the legacy of the revolution, government and business
have denounced them on the authority of the Constitution. 132
This posing of revolution and constitution as polar opposites-order
and disorder, stability and change, governmental regularity and popular
clamor-has artificially delimited the possibilities for American political
expression. In this scheme, fundamentally, the constitution stands for
order; it embraces liberty and democracy, but only within a clear, regular,
and antirevolutionary structure. Therefore, to be loyal to the Constitution
is necessarily to reject revolution. Conversely, to be revolutionary is to
place oneself outside the Constitution's structure. Accordingly, when some
argue that revolutionaries possess only a natural right to revolution, the
implication is clear: by preaching revolution, they have exiled themselves
from the constitutional homeland. As a result, one need not respond to
their arguments as constitutional claims, only as abstract assertions of
natural justice. Several decades ago, Communists bore the brunt of this
charge; today, right-wing revolutionaries do. In both cases, the charge
converted a whiff of revolutionary sympathy into an odor of constitutional
heresy.
This antonymous rendering of constitution and revolution leaves us
only with unsatisfactory options. If we embrace revolution, we must
surrender constitutionalism, with its promise of stability, procedural regu-
larity, and predictability. We must decide to trust the revolutionary people
13OSee MICHAEL KAMMEN, A SEASON OF YOUTH: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND
THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 36-49, 59-65, 70-74 (1978).
131See, e.g., WALTER LAFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN
CENTRAL AMERICA (expanded ed. 1984).
132See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
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under all circumstances, and so we must forget the revolutionary horrors
of the past. If we embrace constitutionalism, we must surrender all pos-
sibility of popular revolution, with its promise of political engagement,
self-rule, and populist control. We must decide to trust the government
under all circumstances, and we must forget the totalitarian horrors of the
past. Either course seems naive and unbalanced.
Happily, the conceptual world is not so simple. The advantage of a
constitutional right to revolution is that it rejects the antonymous view of
the political world: we need not be divided into revolutionaries and con-
stitutionalists. Instead, we can be both at the same time, wedded both to
governmental regularity and the possibility of direct democracy, to incre-
mental reform and the possibility of dramatic change. We can hope that
government will always be faithful to its constitutional mandate, but if it
is not, we can hope that the people will force a restoration. We can seek
to preserve constitutional structure while opening government to direct
popular involvement, and we can endorse revolutionary movements while
seeking to limit them within preexisting constitutional norms. Combining
all of these desiderata in the real world would be hugely difficult, perhaps
virtually impossible, under present conditions. The task will be forever
impossible, however, if we believe that revolution and constitution are
inherently, conceptually incompatible. Recognition of a constitutional right
to revolution would thus, at least, provide a symbol allowing us to imag-
ine a world in which we need not choose between our most deeply held
political values.
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